Sandra Toy v. Coca Cola Enterprises
Workers Comp: Cessation of employment and post-injury employment
Questions Presented: KRS 342.730(1)(c)2. Whether the phrase "during any period of cessation of that employment" refers to the employment to which the worker returned after the injury, the employment in which the injury occurred, or any post-injury employment.
2008-SC-000149-WC.pdf
AFFIRMING
OPINION OF THE COURT
From Court of Appeals
ALJ – Sheila Lowther
Date Rendered: 12/18/2008
Memorandum opinion of the court; all sitting; all concur. To furnish an incentive for partially disabled workers to work as much as they are able, KRS 342.730 provides that they receive a basic income benefit regardless of their post-injury income. In the event that the worker’s employment subsequently ceases, that benefit is doubled. Appellant returned to work after she and her employer agreed to a weekly benefit of $59.65 for 425 weeks. Shortly thereafter, Appellant’s employment was terminated and her weekly benefit doubled. Her former employer later learned that Appellant had taken a new job earning as much or more than she did previously and reduced her benefit to the original amount. Appellant filed a motion with the ALJ contesting the reduction, claiming that KRS 342.730 referred only to the cessation of employment to which she originally returned and that her former employer should not benefit simply because she was able to find other work. The ALJ, Workers’ Compensation Board and Court of Appeals all ruled in favor of the employer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding KRS 342.730 applies “without regard to whether the worker returns to the employment in which the injury occurred or to other employment.”
Digest from SC Case Monthly Summary Report
for December
2008
