Zewoldi vs. Transit Authority of River City
Whether a court should grant a continuance is matter of discretion which depends on its evaluation of a series of factors: 1) the length of the delay; 2) whether the court has granted previous continuances; 3) whether a continuance would result in inconveniences to counsel, witnesses, or the court; 4) whether the delay is purposeful or caused by the accused; 5) availability of competent alternative counsel; 6) the complexity of the case; and 7) whether denial of the continuance would cause identifiable prejudice. Guffey v. Guffey, 323 S.W.3d 369, 371 (Ky. App. 2010)(quoting Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, 814 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Ky. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Lawson v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.3d 534 (Ky. 2001)).
The trial court’s written order did not reflect an analysis of thesefactors. But, even had the trial court included an analysis of those factors, the ruling would still be indefensible. The prejudice to Zewoldi is not only identifiable, it is undeniable. Basic discovery requests remained outstanding, witnesses had yet to be deposed, and the Appellees had yet to even identify some of the witnesses it would later call to give trial testimony. The only factor conceivably justifying the denial of the continuance would the inconvenience to the witnesses and the trial court, but this inconvenience does not outweigh the competing interest of avoiding significant prejudice to Zewoldi.
