Boland-Maloney Lumber Company, Inc. v. Burnett
2008-CA-000059 9/11/09 2009 WL 2901206 DR pending
Opinion by Judge Wine; Judges Acree and Stumbo concurred. The Court affirmed on direct appeal and reversed on cross-appeal a judgment of the circuit court entered subsequent to a jury verdict in favor of the injured person in a negligence action involving an injury occurring on a staircase.
The Court first held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the matter to proceed to the jury absent expert testimony on the defendant’s duty. The uniformity of stair risers on a stairway is an abundantly apparent standard, even among laypersons, so that anyone could interpret the exceptional foreseeability of risk. The Court then held that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow any apportionment of fault to a subcontractor. The right to apportionment did not extend to the subcontractor that had been determined not to be liable as a matter of law. The Court then held that the trial court had the inherent authority to enforce its orders and therefore, did not err in refusing to grant a motion to allow expert testimony when the defendant failed to disclose the experts after an order was entered that no additional discovery would be allowed. The Court then held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony from an economic expert concerning the injured person’s earning capacity. Although the testimony was not based on actual earnings at the time of injury, nothing precluded testimony on the impairment to earn money or the use of a “proxy” to do so, where current earnings were not indicative of earning power. The Court then held that the trial court did not err in allowing testimony in violation of an order that the plaintiff’s witnesses could not testify that the stairs violated the Kentucky Building Code. The defendant waived the issue when it failed to object to the testimony at trial, defendant’s counsel brought up the reference to the Kentucky Building Code, and the testimony was not in violation of the order. The Court then held that the defendant’s failure to specifically object to the final written instructions precluded review but even so, although the present case was not a premises liability case, the use of the term “unreasonably dangerous” was often found instructed in cases other than products liability when dealing with an ordinary care standard so that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in including the instruction. The Court finally held that the trial court erred in excluding evidence related to plaintiff’s claim for future prescription medication expenses. Although there was no expert testimony as to the amount of medication required or the likely cost of the medication over the remainder of the plaintiff’s lifetime, the plaintiff entered the yearly cost of the prescription drugs by avowal and the doctors testified that the plaintiff suffered from a seizure disorder which would likely require him to take medication for the remainder of his life. The Court reversed and remanded for a determination on the sole issue of future prescription medication expenses.
