The Kentucky Court of Appeals announced 33 decisions on June 19, 2015, with 2 of their opinions designated to be published.
Click here for links to all the archived AOC Court of Appeals minutes at the web site for the Administrative Office of the Courts.
Click here for all of a listing of the Kentucky Court Report’s posts of the weekly COA minutes (or you can always access these within the KCR web site at the uppermost dropdown menu option for the Court of Appeals). AOC version of this week’s decisions can be accessed by clicking here.
For the complete set of this week’s minutes listed all decisions (published and not to be published) with links to the full text of each at the AOC, the continue reading below the digested summaries of this week’s published cases.
Published appellate cases for this week – June 19, 2015:
529. Criminal Law, Leaving scene of an accident,
Jeremy Gill vs. Commonwealth of Kentucky
Opinion vacating; Butler County
Intentional collision not qualify as leaving scene of an accident. Directed verdict for defendant should have been granted.
544. Criminal Law, Affirmed denial of motion to amend per RCr 11.42
Terry Melcher vs. Commonwealth of Kentucky
Opinion affirming; Ohio County
Selected not to be published decisions on tort, insurance and civil
Accident and injury lawyers might find the following case of interest:
521. Qualified immunity, Use of canine dog by police
Brian Luckett vs William Murrell
COA, NPO, 6/19/2015
Opinion reversing and remanding; Jefferson County
CLAYTON, JUDGE: This is an appeal from a decision of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying summary judgment to the Appellant, Brian Luckett, on the issue of sovereign immunity. Based upon the following, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case. The actions by Officer Luckett did not meet the burden of bad faith under Yanero. Murrell did not show that Officer Luckett’s use of Willie at the scene was “with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury….” Haugh v. City of Louisville, 242 S.W.3d 683, 686 (Ky. App. 2007 ) (quoting Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at p. 523). Consequently, it was in error for the trial court to deny Officer Luckett’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. We, therefore, reverse this action and remand to the trial court for entry on an order granting Luckett’s motion for summary judgment of qualified immunity.
533. Motor vehicle accident, damages, property damage without expert testimony
Alisha Williams Wallace vs. The Zero Company
COA NPO 6/19/2015
Opinion Affirming; Jefferson County
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant, Alisha Williams Wallace, appeals from a jury verdict and judgment finding Appellee, Gregory McAuliffe, solely responsible for a motor vehicle accident but only awarding her a small percentage of the damages she claimed as a result of said accident. Wallace also appeals from the Jefferson Circuit Court’s denial of her motion for a new trial on damages. Finding no error, we affirm.
Generally, it is within the province of the jury to determine whether medical expenses, or any part thereof, are necessary, reasonable, and injury- connected. Jones v. Mathis, 329 S.W.2d 55 (Ky. 1959). However, “[t]he question regarding the propriety of medical bills does not become a matter for the jury’s resolution if there is nothing in the record tending to show a dispute about the amount of those bills or their relationship to the alleged injuries underlying the action.” Morgan v. Scott, 291 S.W.3d 622, 643 (Ky. 2009) (Emphasis added).
As noted by a panel of this Court in Carlson v. McElroy, 584 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Ky. App. 1979),
[T]he jury was not bound to accept as the absolute truth the testimony of either Carlson or her doctors relating to her injuries, and having the opportunity to observe Carlson giving her testimony and to hear first hand all the other evidence in arriving at their verdict, the jury could have believed Carlson grossly exaggerated the extent of her injuries, if any, or that her injuries were not as a result of this accident. (Citations omitted).
We are of the opinion that the trial court properly ruled that the jury was entitled to determine whether all of Wallace’s claimed past and future medical expenses were necessary, reasonable and related to the subject accident. As such, the trial court’s denial of a directed verdict as well as its denial of a new trial on this issue was proper.
Wallace now argues that the photographs were irrelevant and prejudicial because the condition of the vehicles did not make her injury more or less probable. Further, she contends that the defense introduced the evidence solely to allow the jury to speculate, without any scientific or technical support, that minor property damage equated to minor physical injuries.
The question of whether McAuliffe was solely at fault in causing the accident was disputed at trial.
We find no merit in Wallace’s claim that McAuliffe was required to present an expert witness to testify as to the relationship between the vehicular damage and the extent of her injuries. Contrary to Wallace’s argument, McAuliffe was not attempting to scientifically prove or disprove Wallace’s injuries by establishing the “vehicle-to-vehicle energy transfer.”
“[T]he admissibility of photographs is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling . . . will not be interfered with on appeal except upon clear showing of an abuse of discretion.” Gorman v. Hunt, 19 S.W.3d 662, 668 (Ky. 2000). We agree with the trial court that the photographs were relevant to the issue of causation. Furthermore, because Wallace introduced evidence pertaining to her vehicle’s “undrivability,” her subsequent repair bill, and testimony about skid marks on the road in an effort to establish speed, McAuliffe was entitled to introduce the vehicle photographs for impeachment purposes. We find no abuse of discretion herein.
Wallace’s reliance on Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Rodgers, 179 S.W.3d 815 (Ky. 2005) and Baker v. Hancock, 772 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. App. 1989) are misplaced. Rodgers involved prior bad acts in handling insurance claims and is inapposite to the facts herein. Similarly, Baker simply held that “evidence of other negligent acts should be excluded when offered to prove negligence on a particular occasion.” 772 S.W.2d at 640. Herein, the evidence of Wallace’s other two accidents was not offered to prove her negligence in the subject accident, but rather for the purpose of establishing alternative causes for her claimed medical conditions. “Evidence of a prior and succeeding accident” is clearly relevant to the issue of injury causation. Carlson, 584 S.W.2d at 756. See also Massie v. Salmon, 277 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. 1955).
Furthermore, we must agree with McAuliffe that evidence of the other accidents was admissible for impeachment purposes.
[gview file=”https://kycourtreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/MNT06192015.pdf”]
