COM. OF KY. V. CROMWELL LOUISVILLE ASSOCIATES
REVENUE AND TAXATION: Time limits for contesting real property evaluation
for tax purposes
PUBLISHED: REVERSING AND REMANDING
PANEL: COMBS PRESIDING; KELLER, HENRY CONCUR
DATE RENDERED: 8/8/2008
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: This appeal arose from a contested a 2001 real property tax valuation. The Board concluded that Cromwell had failed to comply with the provisions of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
133.120 and KRS 133.045 because he had not filed his challenge in the same year that the property valuation occurred. The circuit court disagreed and concluded that the Board erred in dismissing Cromwell’s case. COA disagreed with the court’s finding of error by the Board and reversed and remanded with instructions for the court to dismiss this action in accordance with the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals.
The Board determined that KRS 133.120 required Cromwell to have challenged the 2001 tax assessment during the 2001 inspection period. Because Cromwell did not request a conference or a review of the 2001 assessment until the following year (well after the inspection period for the 2001 tax rolls had closed), the Board found that the appeal was fatally flawed and that dismissal was mandated.
The PVA challenged the conclusion of the circuit court that Cromwell properly followed the administrative remedy provisions of KRS 133.120.
KRS 133.120 addresses the mandatory administrative appeals procedure for any party wishing to challenge a PVA’s real property value assessment by a PVA. KRS 133.120(1) provides that any taxpayer desiring to appeal an assessment on real property made by the property valuation administrator shall first request a conference with the property valuation administrator or his designated deputy. The conference shall be held prior to or during the inspection period provided for in KRS 133.045. Taxpayers wishing to challenge decisions of the Board of Assessment Appeals must appeal to the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals. KRS 133.120(10).
It is undisputed that Cromwell did not request a KRS 133.120(1) conference as to the 2001 property valuation – nor did it pursue a KRS 133.120(2) appeal to the Jefferson County Board of Assessment Appeals – until 2002.
The Board of Tax Appeals consequently – and correctly – refused to
entertain Cromwell’s appeal because of its failure to comply with the requirements of the statute; i.e., the filing of its protest during “the current year” of 2001.
Failure to comply fully with KRS 133.120 prevented Cromwell from seeking a
tax refund of an overpayment under the provisions of KRS 134.590.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is reversed, and this matter
is remanded with instructions that the court dismiss this action in
accordance with the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals.
Digested by Michael Stevens