COAKY took a look at the losing party’s tender and satisfaction of the judgment and its relationship to damages.
OLIVER (ROBERT C.)
HILLIARD (J.J.B.), ET AL.
OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
CLAYTON (PRESIDING JUDGE)
COMBS (CONCURS) AND THOMPSON (DISSENTS)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Note that in addition to addressing prejudgment interest, COAKY took a look at emotional distress not being admissible for punitive damages and the propriety of the tender following the verdict and judgment.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: The Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Robert Oliver, appeals several rulings by the trial court and Appellee/Cross-Appellant J.J.B. Hilliard, W.L. Lyons, Inc. (Hilliard Lyons) also appeals the decision of the trial court. Based upon the following, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
D. DENIAL OF OBJECTIONS TO THE DEFENDANTS’ TENDER OF AN INADEQUATE AMOUNT TO THE COURT.
Oliver next contends that on May 29, 2010, the trial court entered an order permitting the Appellees to deposit the jury award of $238,333.33 to the Clerk of the Circuit Court. Oliver refused to accept this amount as it did not include prejudgment interest and costs. Hilliard Lyons deposited monies with the trial court into an interest bearing account from which Oliver could withdraw the funds at any time.
While Oliver contends that this was an “ineffective tender,” we disagree. Oliver relies on the case of Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hollon, 816 S.W.2d 663 (Ky. App. 1991), in support of his motion. Here, unlike Grange, Hilliard Lyons immediately paid into the court the amount of the jury verdict. While it did not pay in prejudgment interest or costs, it was not required to since there had been no determination that those sums were owed. Thus, we deny Oliver’s appeal on this issue.