COA 2010 Minutes July 9,
2010 (Nos. 657-672)
- Above link to minutes is full text of minutes with link to full
of each decision.
- Total number of decisions: 16
- Published Decisions: 2 (658, 661)
- Tort Decisions: 661, 662,
- Workers Comp: 671
658. CRIMINAL. 11.42
ROACH (TERRY WAYNE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
ACREE (PRESIDING JUDGE)
CAPERTON (CONCURS) AND KELLER (CONCURS)
TO BE PUBLISHED
ACREE, JUDGE: Terry Roach appeals the order of the McCracken Circuit Court denying his motions to vacate his sentence and conviction pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 and for a hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm.
661. JURORS (CHALLENGE FOR BIAS, POLICY HOLDERS OF DEFENDANT); HEARSAY
GIBSON (ROY), ET AL. VS. KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.
OPINION AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
ACREE (PRESIDING JUDGE)
COMBS (CONCURS) AND WINE (CONCURS)
TO BE PUBLISHED
ACREE, JUDGE: Appellants Roy Gibson and Clinton Bowman appeal the October 3, 2008 judgment of the Clay Circuit Court entered upon a jury’s verdict finding them liable for fraud and ordering them to pay $43,778.53 to Appellee Kentucky Farm Bureau (KFB) and $14,000 to Appellee Gary Speth. For the following reasons we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for additional findings.
On June 24, 2005, Gibson and Bowman reported to KFB their 2000 Ford F150 had been stolen approximately three weeks earlier; KFB established the date of the loss as June 1, 2005. At the request of KFB, Gibson and Bowman filed a police report. Because they no longer possessed the vehicle’s certificate of title, they also obtained a duplicate title. In accordance with the terms of their KFB insurance policy covering theft of the insured vehicle, Gibson and Bowman soon received a check in the amount of $17,291.50.
In late 2005, an individual named Rogelio Mendez attempted to register the vehicle. He presented the original certificate of title to the clerk; the back of the certificate showed that on March 22, 2005, Gibson and Bowman had executed an assignment of the title to Mendez and their signatures were notarized.1 However, because the vehicle had been reported stolen, the clerk refused to permit Mendez to register the vehicle in his name. Police seized the truck and returned it to KFB. The insurer sold the truck for approximately $7,200.
Believing it had been defrauded, KFB filed a complaint seeking a declaration of rights to the truck as against Sanchez and Speth and asserting a fraud claim against Gibson and Bowman. Gibson and Bowman were represented in the action by counsel and defended against the fraud claim. Speth appeared pro se with the benefit of some assistance from KFB’s counsel. Sanchez was never served and did not appear in the action.
Following trial, a jury determined Gibson and Bowman had defrauded KFB and awarded KFB $43,778.53. The jury also awarded Speth $14,000.3 This appeal followed.
Gibson and Bowman claim the circuit court erred as follows: (1) by failing to strike for cause jurors who were policyholders of insurance issued by KFB; (2) by admitting hearsay testimony of out-of-court statements made by Sanchez; (3) by awarding KFB costs of investigating and prosecuting the claim; and (4) by awarding damages to Speth in absence of a finding he was defrauded and without proof of his loss. We address those assignments of error in that order.
Jury Selection. Gibson and Bowman claim the circuit court erred by overruling their motion to strike for cause prospective jurors who were also holders of KFB polices. The argument Gibson and Bowman present is that no KFB policyholder was capable of sitting as an unbiased juror in this case. That is, they argue the policyholders’ status alone required striking them for cause. True, by statute, certain persons are subject to challenge for cause merely because of their status. Howell v. Commonwealth, 489 S.W.2d 21, 22-23 (Ky. 1972)(Former Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 29.025, now KRS 29A.080(2)(b), disqualifies felons from jury service; “a juror in such status is subject to challenge for cause”). However, this panel may not, by creating the bright line test suggested by this argument, take from the province of the trial court the discretion to determine the qualifications of any jurors in the venire not otherwise disqualified by KRS 29A.080(2).
We do not exclude the possibility that one or more jurors in this case may have had such a concern about their relationship with KFB that they might be deemed biased. However, we can only speculate as to the existence of actual bias because Gibson and Bowman simply did not inquire further into the matter during voir dire either with any individual juror or with the venire. Relevant inquiries could have determined whether any particular juror had a concern that a judgment in the case would affect them personally. In this case, the only information about the juror-policyholders available to the trial court was that the potential for bias existed. Absent further indication from the voir dire that any juror, because of his or her relationship with KFB, was actually biased or would have difficulty fairly Deciding the case, we cannot label the trial court’s refusal to strike any jurors for cause an abuse of discretion.
At trial KFB introduced certain of Sanchez’s statements through its investigator, Keller, because Sanchez was unavailable to testify. Additionally, the statements made by Sanchez to the investigator were not used against Sanchez. Rather, they were used against Gibson and Bowman in prosecution of the fraud claim. KFB never claimed that Sanchez had defrauded anyone. Therefore, Sanchez’s out-of-court statements could not be permissibly introduced pursuant to this rule.
In the context of Keller’s interview with Sanchez, it becomes clear the statements at issue were actually self-serving. Keller was conducting the interview to determine which scenario was accurate: (1) that Sanchez stole the truck and then used it as collateral on a $7,000 loan, or (2) that Gibson had legally conveyed the truck to Sanchez and then fraudulently reported it stolen. Given those options, it was decidedly in Sanchez’s interest to state he acquired the truck from Gibson in a legal manner and then left it with Speth. The conversation with Keller was therefore inadmissible as statements against the declarant’s interest.
In light of the other evidence of fraud, however, any error in admitting Sanchez’s statements to KFB’s investigator was harmless.